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Revert overly aggressive "layered defence" that went into 2.45.1
and friends, which broke "git-lfs", "git-annex", and other use
cases, so that we can rebuild necessary counterparts in the open.
* jc/fix-2.45.1-and-friends-for-2.39:
Revert "fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir"
Revert "Add a helper function to compare file contents"
clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run
tests: verify that `clone -c core.hooksPath=/dev/null` works again
Revert "core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning"
init: use the correct path of the templates directory again
hook: plug a new memory leak
ci: stop installing "gcc-13" for osx-gcc
ci: avoid bare "gcc" for osx-gcc job
ci: drop mention of BREW_INSTALL_PACKAGES variable
send-email: avoid creating more than one Term::ReadLine object
send-email: drop FakeTerm hack
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As part of the security bug-fix releases v2.39.4, ..., v2.45.1, I
introduced logic to safeguard `git clone` from running hooks that were
installed _during_ the clone operation.
The rationale was that Git's CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2021-21300,
CVE-2019-1354, CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1352, and CVE-2019-1349 should
have been low-severity vulnerabilities but were elevated to
critical/high severity by the attack vector that allows a weakness where
files inside `.git/` can be inadvertently written during a `git clone`
to escalate to a Remote Code Execution attack by virtue of installing a
malicious `post-checkout` hook that Git will then run at the end of the
operation without giving the user a chance to see what code is executed.
Unfortunately, Git LFS uses a similar strategy to install its own
`post-checkout` hook during a `git clone`; In fact, Git LFS is
installing four separate hooks while running the `smudge` filter.
While this pattern is probably in want of being improved by introducing
better support in Git for Git LFS and other tools wishing to register
hooks to be run at various stages of Git's commands, let's undo the
clone protections to unbreak Git LFS-enabled clones.
This reverts commit 8db1e8743c0 (clone: prevent hooks from running
during a clone, 2024-03-28).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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* maint-2.39: (38 commits)
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
fetch/clone: detect dubious ownership of local repositories
...
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This topic addresses two CVEs:
- CVE-2024-32020:
Local clones may end up hardlinking files into the target repository's
object database when source and target repository reside on the same
disk. If the source repository is owned by a different user, then
those hardlinked files may be rewritten at any point in time by the
untrusted user.
- CVE-2024-32021:
When cloning a local source repository that contains symlinks via the
filesystem, Git may create hardlinks to arbitrary user-readable files
on the same filesystem as the target repository in the objects/
directory.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Critical security issues typically combine relatively common
vulnerabilities such as case confusion in file paths with other
weaknesses in order to raise the severity of the attack.
One such weakness that has haunted the Git project in many a
submodule-related CVE is that any hooks that are found are executed
during a clone operation. Examples are the `post-checkout` and
`fsmonitor` hooks.
However, Git's design calls for hooks to be disabled by default, as only
disabled example hooks are copied over from the templates in
`<prefix>/share/git-core/templates/`.
As a defense-in-depth measure, let's prevent those hooks from running.
Obviously, administrators can choose to drop enabled hooks into the
template directory, though, _and_ it is also possible to override
`core.hooksPath`, in which case the new check needs to be disabled.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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We will need to call this function from `hook.c` to be able to prevent
hooks from running that were written as part of a `clone` but did not
originate from the template directory.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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Submodules are stored in subdirectories of their superproject. When
these subdirectories have been replaced with symlinks by a malicious
actor, all kinds of mayhem can be caused.
This _should_ not be possible, but many CVEs in the past showed that
_when_ possible, it allows attackers to slip in code that gets executed
during, say, a `git clone --recursive` operation.
Let's add some defense-in-depth to disallow submodule paths to have
anything except directories in them.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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In 0060fd1511b (clone --recurse-submodules: prevent name squatting on
Windows, 2019-09-12), I introduced code to verify that a git dir either
does not exist, or is at least empty, to fend off attacks where an
inadvertently (and likely maliciously) pre-populated git dir would be
used while cloning submodules recursively.
The logic used `access(<path>, X_OK)` to verify that a directory exists
before calling `is_empty_dir()` on it. That is a curious way to check
for a directory's existence and might well fail for unwanted reasons.
Even the original author (it was I ;-) ) struggles to explain why this
function was used rather than `stat()`.
This code was _almost_ copypastad in the previous commit, but that
`access()` call was caught during review.
Let's use `stat()` instead also in the code that was almost copied
verbatim. Let's not use `lstat()` because in the unlikely event that
somebody snuck a symbolic link in, pointing to a crafted directory, we
want to verify that that directory is empty.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When creating a submodule path, we must be careful not to follow
symbolic links. Otherwise we may follow a symbolic link pointing to
a gitdir (which are valid symbolic links!) e.g. while cloning.
On case-insensitive filesystems, however, we blindly replace a directory
that has been created as part of the `clone` operation with a symlink
when the path to the latter differs only in case from the former's path.
Let's simply avoid this situation by expecting not ever having to
overwrite any existing file/directory/symlink upon cloning. That way, we
won't even replace a directory that we just created.
This addresses CVE-2024-32002.
Reported-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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While it is expected to have several git dirs within the `.git/modules/`
tree, it is important that they do not interfere with each other. For
example, if one submodule was called "captain" and another submodule
"captain/hooks", their respective git dirs would clash, as they would be
located in `.git/modules/captain/` and `.git/modules/captain/hooks/`,
respectively, i.e. the latter's files could clash with the actual Git
hooks of the former.
To prevent these clashes, and in particular to prevent hooks from being
written and then executed as part of a recursive clone, we introduced
checks as part of the fix for CVE-2019-1387 in a8dee3ca61 (Disallow
dubiously-nested submodule git directories, 2019-10-01).
It is currently possible to bypass the check for clashing submodule
git dirs in two ways:
1. parallel cloning
2. checkout --recurse-submodules
Let's check not only before, but also after parallel cloning (and before
checking out the submodule), that the git dir is not clashing with
another one, otherwise fail. This addresses the parallel cloning issue.
As to the parallel checkout issue: It requires quite a few manual steps
to create clashing git dirs because Git itself would refuse to
initialize the inner one, as demonstrated by the test case.
Nevertheless, let's teach the recursive checkout (namely, the
`submodule_move_head()` function that is used by the recursive checkout)
to be careful to verify that it does not use a clashing git dir, and if
it does, disable it (by deleting the `HEAD` file so that subsequent Git
calls won't recognize it as a git dir anymore).
Note: The parallel cloning test case contains a `cat err` that proved to
be highly useful when analyzing the racy nature of the operation (the
operation can fail with three different error messages, depending on
timing), and was left on purpose to ease future debugging should the
need arise.
Signed-off-by: Filip Hejsek <filip.hejsek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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The upload-pack command tries to avoid trusting the repository in which
it's run (e.g., by not running any hooks and not using any config that
contains arbitrary commands). But if the server side of a fetch or a
clone is a partial clone, then either upload-pack or its child
pack-objects may run a lazy "git fetch" under the hood. And it is very
easy to convince fetch to run arbitrary commands.
The "server" side can be a local repository owned by someone else, who
would be able to configure commands that are run during a clone with the
current user's permissions. This issue has been designated
CVE-2024-32004.
The fix in this commit's parent helps in this scenario, as well as in
related scenarios using SSH to clone, where the untrusted .git directory
is owned by a different user id. But if you received one as a zip file,
on a USB stick, etc, it may be owned by your user but still untrusted.
This has been designated CVE-2024-32465.
To mitigate the issue more completely, let's disable lazy fetching
entirely during `upload-pack`. While fetching from a partial repository
should be relatively rare, it is certainly not an unreasonable workflow.
And thus we need to provide an escape hatch.
This commit works by respecting a GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH environment variable
(to skip the lazy-fetch), and setting it in upload-pack, but only when
the user has not already done so (which gives us the escape hatch).
The name of the variable is specifically chosen to match what has
already been added in 'master' via e6d5479e7a (git: extend
--no-lazy-fetch to work across subprocesses, 2024-02-27). Since we're
building this fix as a backport for older versions, we could cherry-pick
that patch and its earlier steps. However, we don't really need the
niceties (like a "--no-lazy-fetch" option) that it offers. By using the
same name, everything should just work when the two are eventually
merged, but here are a few notes:
- the blocking of the fetch in e6d5479e7a is incomplete! It sets
fetch_if_missing to 0 when we setup the repository variable, but
that isn't enough. pack-objects in particular will call
prefetch_to_pack() even if that variable is 0. This patch by
contrast checks the environment variable at the lowest level before
we call the lazy fetch, where we can be sure to catch all code
paths.
Possibly the setting of fetch_if_missing from e6d5479e7a can be
reverted, but it may be useful to have. For example, some code may
want to use that flag to change behavior before it gets to the point
of trying to start the fetch. At any rate, that's all outside the
scope of this patch.
- there's documentation for GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH in e6d5479e7a. We can
live without that here, because for the most part the user shouldn't
need to set it themselves. The exception is if they do want to
override upload-pack's default, and that requires a separate
documentation section (which is added here)
- it would be nice to use the NO_LAZY_FETCH_ENVIRONMENT macro added by
e6d5479e7a, but those definitions have moved from cache.h to
environment.h between 2.39.3 and master. I just used the raw string
literals, and we can replace them with the macro once this topic is
merged to master.
At least with respect to CVE-2024-32004, this does render this commit's
parent commit somewhat redundant. However, it is worth retaining that
commit as defense in depth, and because it may help other issues (e.g.,
symlink/hardlink TOCTOU races, where zip files are not really an
interesting attack vector).
The tests in t0411 still pass, but now we have _two_ mechanisms ensuring
that the evil command is not run. Let's beef up the existing ones to
check that they failed for the expected reason, that we refused to run
upload-pack at all with an alternate user id. And add two new ones for
the same-user case that both the restriction and its escape hatch.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When performing a local clone of a repository we end up either copying
or hardlinking the source repository into the target repository. This is
significantly more performant than if we were to use git-upload-pack(1)
and git-fetch-pack(1) to create the new repository and preserves both
disk space and compute time.
Unfortunately though, performing such a local clone of a repository that
is not owned by the current user is inherently unsafe:
- It is possible that source files get swapped out underneath us while
we are copying or hardlinking them. While we do perform some checks
here to assert that we hardlinked the expected file, they cannot
reliably thwart time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) style races. It
is thus possible for an adversary to make us copy or hardlink
unexpected files into the target directory.
Ideally, we would address this by starting to use openat(3P),
fstatat(3P) and friends. Due to platform compatibility with Windows
we cannot easily do that though. Furthermore, the scope of these
fixes would likely be quite broad and thus not fit for an embargoed
security release.
- Even if we handled TOCTOU-style races perfectly, hardlinking files
owned by a different user into the target repository is not a good
idea in general. It is possible for an adversary to rewrite those
files to contain whatever data they want even after the clone has
completed.
Address these issues by completely refusing local clones of a repository
that is not owned by the current user. This reuses our existing infra we
have in place via `ensure_valid_ownership()` and thus allows a user to
override the safety guard by adding the source repository path to the
"safe.directory" configuration.
This addresses CVE-2024-32020.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When performing local clones with hardlinks we refuse to copy source
files which are symlinks as a mitigation for CVE-2022-39253. This check
can be raced by an adversary though by changing the file to a symlink
after we have checked it.
Fix the issue by checking whether the hardlinked destination file
matches the source file and abort in case it doesn't.
This addresses CVE-2024-32021.
Reported-by: Apple Product Security <product-security@apple.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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When a user performs a local clone without `--no-local`, then we end up
copying the source repository into the target repository directly. To
optimize this even further, we try to hardlink files into place instead
of copying data over, which helps both disk usage and speed.
There is an important edge case in this context though, namely when we
try to hardlink symlinks from the source repository into the target
repository. Depending on both platform and filesystem the resulting
behaviour here can be different:
- On macOS and NetBSD, calling link(3P) with a symlink target creates
a hardlink to the file pointed to by the symlink.
- On Linux, calling link(3P) instead creates a hardlink to the symlink
itself.
To unify this behaviour, 36596fd2df (clone: better handle symlinked
files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10) introduced logic to resolve symlinks
before we try to link(3P) files. Consequently, the new behaviour was to
always create a hard link to the target of the symlink on all platforms.
Eventually though, we figured out that following symlinks like this can
cause havoc when performing a local clone of a malicious repository,
which resulted in CVE-2022-39253. This issue was fixed via 6f054f9fb3
(builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks, 2022-07-28),
by refusing symlinks in the source repository.
But even though we now shouldn't ever link symlinks anymore, the code
that resolves symlinks still exists. In the best case the code does not
end up doing anything because there are no symlinks anymore. In the
worst case though this can be abused by an adversary that rewrites the
source file after it has been checked not to be a symlink such that it
actually is a symlink when we call link(3P). Thus, it is still possible
to recreate CVE-2022-39253 due to this time-of-check-time-of-use bug.
Remove the call to `realpath()`. This doesn't yet address the actual
vulnerability, which will be handled in a subsequent commit.
Reported-by: Apple Product Security <product-security@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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The format.attach configuration variable lacked a way to override a
value defined in a lower-priority configuration file (e.g. the
system one) by redefining it in a higher-priority configuration
file. Now, setting format.attach to an empty string means show the
patch inline in the e-mail message, without using MIME attachment.
This is a backward incompatible change.
* jc/countermand-format-attach:
format.attach: allow empty value to disable multi-part messages
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The credential subsystem learned that a password may have an
explicit expiration.
* mh/credential-password-expiry:
credential: new attribute password_expiry_utc
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"git fetch --jobs=0" used to hit a BUG(), which has been corrected
to use the available CPUs.
* ma/fetch-parallel-use-online-cpus:
fetch: choose a sensible default with --jobs=0 again
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Some passwords have an expiry date known at generation. This may be
years away for a personal access token or hours for an OAuth access
token.
When multiple credential helpers are configured, `credential fill` tries
each helper in turn until it has a username and password, returning
early. If Git authentication succeeds, `credential approve`
stores the successful credential in all helpers. If authentication
fails, `credential reject` erases matching credentials in all helpers.
Helpers implement corresponding operations: get, store, erase.
The credential protocol has no expiry attribute, so helpers cannot
store expiry information. Even if a helper returned an improvised
expiry attribute, git credential discards unrecognised attributes
between operations and between helpers.
This is a particular issue when a storage helper and a
credential-generating helper are configured together:
[credential]
helper = storage # eg. cache or osxkeychain
helper = generate # eg. oauth
`credential approve` stores the generated credential in both helpers
without expiry information. Later `credential fill` may return an
expired credential from storage. There is no workaround, no matter how
clever the second helper. The user sees authentication fail (a retry
will succeed).
Introduce a password expiry attribute. In `credential fill`, ignore
expired passwords and continue to query subsequent helpers.
In the example above, `credential fill` ignores the expired password
and a fresh credential is generated. If authentication succeeds,
`credential approve` replaces the expired password in storage.
If authentication fails, the expired credential is erased by
`credential reject`. It is unnecessary but harmless for storage
helpers to self prune expired credentials.
Add support for the new attribute to credential-cache.
Eventually, I hope to see support in other popular storage helpers.
Example usage in a credential-generating helper
https://github.com/hickford/git-credential-oauth/pull/16
Signed-off-by: M Hickford <mirth.hickford@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Calvin Wan <calvinwan@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Extend the run-hooks API to allow feeding data from the standard
input when running the hook script(s).
* ab/hook-api-with-stdin:
hook: support a --to-stdin=<path> option
sequencer: use the new hook API for the simpler "post-rewrite" call
hook API: support passing stdin to hooks, convert am's 'post-rewrite'
run-command: allow stdin for run_processes_parallel
run-command.c: remove dead assignment in while-loop
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Leak fixes.
* ab/various-leak-fixes:
push: free_refs() the "local_refs" in set_refspecs()
push: refactor refspec_append_mapped() for subsequent leak-fix
receive-pack: release the linked "struct command *" list
grep API: plug memory leaks by freeing "header_list"
grep.c: refactor free_grep_patterns()
builtin/merge.c: free "&buf" on "Your local changes..." error
builtin/merge.c: use fixed strings, not "strbuf", fix leak
show-branch: free() allocated "head" before return
commit-graph: fix a parse_options_concat() leak
http-backend.c: fix cmd_main() memory leak, refactor reg{exec,free}()
http-backend.c: fix "dir" and "cmd_arg" leaks in cmd_main()
worktree: fix a trivial leak in prune_worktrees()
repack: fix leaks on error with "goto cleanup"
name-rev: don't xstrdup() an already dup'd string
various: add missing clear_pathspec(), fix leaks
clone: use free() instead of UNLEAK()
commit-graph: use free_commit_graph() instead of UNLEAK()
bundle.c: don't leak the "args" in the "struct child_process"
tests: mark tests as passing with SANITIZE=leak
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Doc update.
* jk/doc-ls-remote-matching:
doc/ls-remote: clarify pattern format
doc/ls-remote: cosmetic cleanups for examples
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Remove more remaining uses of macros that relies on the_index
singleton instance without explicitly spelling it out.
* ab/the-index-compatibility:
cocci & cache.h: remove "USE_THE_INDEX_COMPATIBILITY_MACROS"
cache-tree API: remove redundant update_main_cache_tree()
cocci & cache-tree.h: migrate "write_cache_as_tree" to "*_index_*"
cocci & cache.h: apply pending "index_cache_pos" rule
cocci & cache.h: fully apply "active_nr" part of index-compatibility
builtin/rm.c: use narrower "USE_THE_INDEX_VARIABLE"
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"git name-rev" heuristics update.
* en/name-rev-make-taggerdate-much-less-important:
name-rev: fix names by dropping taggerdate workaround
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prior to 51243f9 (run-command API: don't fall back on online_cpus(),
2022-10-12) `git fetch --multiple --jobs=0` would choose some default amount
of jobs, similar to `git -c fetch.parallel=0 fetch --multiple`. While our
documentation only ever promised that `fetch.parallel` would fall back to a
"sensible default", it makes sense to do the same for `--jobs`. So fall back
to online_cpus() and not BUG() out.
This fixes https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/issues/4302
Reported-by: Drew Noakes <drnoakes@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthias Aßhauer <mha1993@live.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When a lower precedence configuration file (e.g. /etc/gitconfig)
defines format.attach in any way, there was no way to disable it in
a more specific configuration file (e.g. $HOME/.gitconfig).
Change the behaviour of setting it to an empty string. It used to
mean that the result is still a multipart message with only dashes
used as a multi-part separator, but now it resets the setting to
the default (which would be to give an inline patch, unless other
command line options are in effect).
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Finally retire the scripted "git add -p/-i" implementation and have
everybody use the one reimplemented in C.
* ab/retire-scripted-add-p:
docs & comments: replace mentions of "git-add--interactive.perl"
add API: remove run_add_interactive() wrapper function
add: remove "add.interactive.useBuiltin" & Perl "git add--interactive"
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Type fixes.
* rs/size-t-fixes:
pack-objects: use strcspn(3) in name_cmp_len()
read-cache: use size_t for {base,df}_name_compare()
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Plug leaks in sequencer subsystem and its users.
* ab/sequencer-unleak:
commit.c: free() revs.commit in get_fork_point()
builtin/rebase.c: free() "options.strategy_opts"
sequencer.c: always free() the "msgbuf" in do_pick_commit()
builtin/rebase.c: fix "options.onto_name" leak
builtin/revert.c: move free-ing of "revs" to replay_opts_release()
sequencer API users: fix get_replay_opts() leaks
sequencer.c: split up sequencer_remove_state()
rebase: use "cleanup" pattern in do_interactive_rebase()
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The bundle-URI subsystem adds support for creation-token heuristics
to help incremental fetches.
* ds/bundle-uri-5:
bundle-uri: test missing bundles with heuristic
bundle-uri: store fetch.bundleCreationToken
fetch: fetch from an external bundle URI
bundle-uri: drop bundle.flag from design doc
clone: set fetch.bundleURI if appropriate
bundle-uri: download in creationToken order
bundle-uri: parse bundle.<id>.creationToken values
bundle-uri: parse bundle.heuristic=creationToken
t5558: add tests for creationToken heuristic
bundle: verify using check_connected()
bundle: test unbundling with incomplete history
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Code clean-up.
* rs/am-parse-options-cleanup:
am: don't pass strvec to apply_parse_options()
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Code clean-up around unused function parameters.
* jk/unused-post-2.39:
userdiff: mark unused parameter in internal callback
list-objects-filter: mark unused parameters in virtual functions
diff: mark unused parameters in callbacks
xdiff: mark unused parameter in xdl_call_hunk_func()
xdiff: drop unused parameter in def_ff()
ws: drop unused parameter from ws_blank_line()
list-objects: drop process_gitlink() function
blob: drop unused parts of parse_blob_buffer()
ls-refs: use repository parameter to iterate refs
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Fix a pair of bugs in 'git branch'.
* rj/branch-copy-and-rename:
branch: force-copy a branch to itself via @{-1} is a no-op
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"git ls-tree --format='%(path) %(path)' $tree $path" showed the
path three times, which has been corrected.
* rs/ls-tree-path-expansion-fix:
ls-tree: remove dead store and strbuf for quote_c_style()
ls-tree: fix expansion of repeated %(path)
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Fix to a small regression in 2.38 days.
* ab/bundle-wo-args:
bundle <cmd>: have usage_msg_opt() note the missing "<file>"
builtin/bundle.c: remove superfluous "newargc" variable
bundle: don't segfault on "git bundle <subcmd>"
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We document that you can specify "refs" to ls-remote, but we don't
explain any further than that they are "matched" as patterns. Since this
can be interpreted in a lot of ways, let's clarify that they are
tail-matched globs.
Likewise, let's use the word "patterns" to refer to them consistently,
rather than "refs" (both here and in the quick "-h" help), and mention
more explicitly that only one pattern needs to be matched (though there
is also an example already that shows this in action).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Have the last users of "USE_THE_INDEX_COMPATIBILITY_MACROS" use the
underlying *_index() variants instead. Now all previous users of
"USE_THE_INDEX_COMPATIBILITY_MACROS" have been migrated away from the
wrapper macros, and if applicable to use the "USE_THE_INDEX_VARIABLE"
added in [1].
Let's leave the "index-compatibility.cocci" in place, even though it
won't be doing anything on "master". It will benefit any out-of-tree
code that need to use these compatibility macros. We can eventually
remove it.
1. bdafeae0b9c (cache.h & test-tool.h: add & use
"USE_THE_INDEX_VARIABLE", 2022-11-19)
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Remove the redundant update_main_cache_tree() function, and make its
users use cache_tree_update() instead.
The behavior of populating the "the_index.cache_tree" if it wasn't
present already was needed when this function was introduced in [1],
but it hasn't been needed since [2]; The "cache_tree_update()" will
now lazy-allocate, so there's no need for the wrapper.
1. 996277c5206 (Refactor cache_tree_update idiom from commit,
2011-12-06)
2. fb0882648e0 (cache-tree: clean up cache_tree_update(), 2021-01-23)
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Add a trivial rule for "write_cache_as_tree" to
"index-compatibility.cocci", and apply it. This was left out of the
rules added in 0e6550a2c63 (cocci: add a
index-compatibility.pending.cocci, 2022-11-19) because this
compatibility wrapper lived in "cache-tree.h", not "cache.h"
But it's like the other "USE_THE_INDEX_COMPATIBILITY_MACROS", so let's
migrate it too.
The replacement of "USE_THE_INDEX_COMPATIBILITY_MACROS" here with
"USE_THE_INDEX_VARIABLE" is a manual change on top, now that these
files only use "&the_index", and don't need any compatibility
macros (or functions).
The wrapping of some argument lists is likewise manual, as coccinelle
would otherwise give us overly long argument lists.
The reason for putting the "O" in the cocci rule on the "-" and "+"
lines is because I couldn't get correct whitespacing otherwise,
i.e. I'd end up with "oid,&the_index", not "oid, &the_index".
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Apply the rule added in [1] to change "cache_name_pos" to
"index_name_pos", which allows us to get rid of another
"USE_THE_INDEX_COMPATIBILITY_MACROS" macro.
The replacement of "USE_THE_INDEX_COMPATIBILITY_MACROS" here with
"USE_THE_INDEX_VARIABLE" is a manual change on top, now that these
files only use "&the_index", and don't need any compatibility
macros (or functions).
1. 0e6550a2c63 (cocci: add a index-compatibility.pending.cocci,
2022-11-19)
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Apply the "active_nr" part of "index-compatibility.pending.cocci",
which was left out in [1] due to an in-flight conflict. As of [2] the
topic we conflicted with has been merged to "master", so we can fully
apply this rule.
1. dc594180d9e (cocci & cache.h: apply variable section of "pending"
index-compatibility, 2022-11-19)
2. 9ea1378d046 (Merge branch 'ab/various-leak-fixes', 2022-12-14)
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Replace the "USE_THE_INDEX_COMPATIBILITY_MACROS" define with the
narrower "USE_THE_INDEX_VARIABLE". This could have been done in
07047d68294 (cocci: apply "pending" index-compatibility to some
"builtin/*.c", 2022-11-19), but I missed it at the time.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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"git pack-objects" learned to release delta-island bitmap data when
it is done using it, saving peak heap memory usage.
* ew/free-island-marks:
delta-islands: free island_marks and bitmaps
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Commit 7550424804 ("name-rev: include taggerdate in considering the best
name", 2016-04-22) introduced the idea of using taggerdate in the
criteria for selecting the best name. At the time, a certain commit in
linux.git -- namely, aed06b9cfcab -- was being named by name-rev as
v4.6-rc1~9^2~792
which, while correct, was very suboptimal. Some investigation found
that tweaking the MERGE_TRAVERSAL_WEIGHT to lower it could give
alternate answers such as
v3.13-rc7~9^2~14^2~42
or
v3.13~5^2~4^2~2^2~1^2~42
A manual solution involving looking at tagger dates came up with
v3.13-rc1~65^2^2~42
which is much nicer. That workaround was then implemented in name-rev.
Unfortunately, the taggerdate heuristic is causing bugs. I was pointed
to a case in a private repository where name-rev reports a name of the
form
v2022.10.02~86
when users expected to see one of the form
v2022.10.01~2
(I've modified the names and numbers a bit from the real testcase.) As
you can probably guess, v2022.10.01 was created after v2022.10.02 (by a
few hours), even though it pointed to an older commit. While the
condition is unusual even in the repository in question, it is not the
only problematic set of tags in that repository. The taggerdate logic
is causing problems.
Further, it turns out that this taggerdate heuristic isn't even helping
anymore. Due to the fix to naming logic in 3656f84278 ("name-rev:
prefer shorter names over following merges", 2021-12-04), we get
improved names without the taggerdate heuristic. For the original
commit of interest in linux.git, a modern git without the taggerdate
heuristic still provides the same optimal answer of interest, namely:
v3.13-rc1~65^2^2~42
So, the taggerdate is no longer providing benefit, and it is causing
problems. Simply get rid of it.
However, note that "taggerdate" as a variable is used to store things
besides a taggerdate these days. Ever since commit ef1e74065c
("name-rev: favor describing with tags and use committer date to
tiebreak", 2017-03-29), this has been used to store committer dates and
there it is used as a fallback tiebreaker (as opposed to a primary
criteria overriding effective distance calculations). We do not want to
remove that fallback tiebreaker, so not all instances of "taggerdate"
are removed in this change.
Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Expose the "path_to_stdin" API added in the preceding commit in the
"git hook run" command.
For now we won't be using this command interface outside of the tests,
but exposing this functionality makes it easier to test the hook
API. The plan is to use this to extend the "sendemail-validate"
hook[1][2].
1. https://lore.kernel.org/git/ad152e25-4061-9955-d3e6-a2c8b1bd24e7@amd.com
2. https://lore.kernel.org/git/20230120012459.920932-1-michael.strawbridge@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Emily Shaffer <emilyshaffer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Convert the invocation of the 'post-rewrite' hook run by 'git am' to
use the hook.h library. To do this we need to add a "path_to_stdin"
member to "struct run_hooks_opt".
In our API this is supported by asking for a file path, rather
than by reading stdin. Reading directly from stdin would involve caching
the entire stdin (to memory or to disk) once the hook API is made to
support "jobs" larger than 1, along with support for executing N hooks
at a time (i.e. the upcoming config-based hooks).
Signed-off-by: Emily Shaffer <emilyshaffer@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When the "strategy_opts" member was added in ba1905a5fef (builtin
rebase: add support for custom merge strategies, 2018-09-04) the
corresponding free() for it at the end of cmd_rebase() wasn't added,
let's do so.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Similar to the existing "squash_onto_name" added in [1] we need to
free() the xstrdup()'d "options.onto.name" added for "--keep-base" in
[2]..
1. 9dba809a69a (builtin rebase: support --root, 2018-09-04)
2. 414d924beb4 (rebase: teach rebase --keep-base, 2019-08-27)
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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In [1] and [2] I added the code being moved here to cmd_revert() and
cmd_cherry_pick(), now that we've got a "replay_opts_release()" for
the "struct replay_opts" it should know how to free these "revs",
rather than having these users reach into the struct to free its
individual members.
1. d1ec656d68f (cherry-pick: free "struct replay_opts" members,
2022-11-08)
2. fd74ac95ac3 (revert: free "struct replay_opts" members, 2022-07-01)
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Make the replay_opts_release() function added in the preceding commit
non-static, and use it for freeing the "struct replay_opts"
constructed for "rebase" and "revert".
To safely call our new replay_opts_release() we'll need to stop
calling it in sequencer_remove_state(), and instead call it where we
allocate the "struct replay_opts" itself.
This is because in e.g. do_interactive_rebase() we construct a "struct
replay_opts" with "get_replay_opts()", and then call
"complete_action()". If we get far enough in that function without
encountering errors we'll call "pick_commits()" which (indirectly)
calls sequencer_remove_state() at the end.
But if we encounter errors anywhere along the way we'd punt out early,
and not free() the memory we allocated. Remembering whether we
previously called sequencer_remove_state() would be a hassle.
Using a FREE_AND_NULL() pattern would also work, as it would be safe
to call replay_opts_release() repeatedly. But let's fix this properly
instead, by having the owner of the data free() it.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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