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| author | Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org> | 2025-09-18 18:00:26 +0900 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> | 2025-09-19 19:03:01 +0200 |
| commit | 61da0bd4102c459823fbe6b8b43b01fb6ace4a22 (patch) | |
| tree | e9eb2d993a96c98fa088f3d96d9829e82f573416 /drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c | |
| parent | can: hi311x: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow (diff) | |
| download | linux-61da0bd4102c459823fbe6b8b43b01fb6ace4a22.tar.gz linux-61da0bd4102c459823fbe6b8b43b01fb6ace4a22.zip | |
can: sun4i_can: populate ndo_change_mtu() to prevent buffer overflow
Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to
directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check
which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that
skb->len fits the interface's MTU.
Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its
net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to
configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example:
$ ip link set can0 mtu 9999
After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the
ETH_P_CANXL protocol:
socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL))
to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example:
struct canxl_frame frame = {
.flags = 0xff,
.len = 2048,
};
The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to
check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the
malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks:
1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the
function does not check the actual device capabilities).
2. the length is a valid CAN XL length.
And so, sun4ican_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not
able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame.
This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len
as-is with no further checks on this line:
dlc = cf->len;
Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In
our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the
maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs a
couple line below when doing:
for (i = 0; i < dlc; i++)
writel(cf->data[i], priv->base + (dreg + i * 4));
Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the
interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By
fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow.
Fixes: 0738eff14d81 ("can: Allwinner A10/A20 CAN Controller support - Kernel module")
Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol <mailhol@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-3-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c b/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c index 6fcb301ef611..53bfd873de9b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c @@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops sun4ican_netdev_ops = { .ndo_open = sun4ican_open, .ndo_stop = sun4ican_close, .ndo_start_xmit = sun4ican_start_xmit, + .ndo_change_mtu = can_change_mtu, }; static const struct ethtool_ops sun4ican_ethtool_ops = { |
