clone: drop the protections where hooks aren't run

As part of the security bug-fix releases v2.39.4, ..., v2.45.1, I
introduced logic to safeguard `git clone` from running hooks that were
installed _during_ the clone operation.

The rationale was that Git's CVE-2024-32002, CVE-2021-21300,
CVE-2019-1354, CVE-2019-1353, CVE-2019-1352, and CVE-2019-1349 should
have been low-severity vulnerabilities but were elevated to
critical/high severity by the attack vector that allows a weakness where
files inside `.git/` can be inadvertently written during a `git clone`
to escalate to a Remote Code Execution attack by virtue of installing a
malicious `post-checkout` hook that Git will then run at the end of the
operation without giving the user a chance to see what code is executed.

Unfortunately, Git LFS uses a similar strategy to install its own
`post-checkout` hook during a `git clone`; In fact, Git LFS is
installing four separate hooks while running the `smudge` filter.

While this pattern is probably in want of being improved by introducing
better support in Git for Git LFS and other tools wishing to register
hooks to be run at various stages of Git's commands, let's undo the
clone protections to unbreak Git LFS-enabled clones.

This reverts commit 8db1e8743c0 (clone: prevent hooks from running
during a clone, 2024-03-28).

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/hook.c b/hook.c
index fc974cee1d..22b274b60b 100644
--- a/hook.c
+++ b/hook.c
@@ -3,32 +3,6 @@
 #include "run-command.h"
 #include "config.h"
 
-static int identical_to_template_hook(const char *name, const char *path)
-{
-	const char *env = getenv("GIT_CLONE_TEMPLATE_DIR");
-	const char *template_dir = get_template_dir(env && *env ? env : NULL);
-	struct strbuf template_path = STRBUF_INIT;
-	int found_template_hook, ret;
-
-	strbuf_addf(&template_path, "%s/hooks/%s", template_dir, name);
-	found_template_hook = access(template_path.buf, X_OK) >= 0;
-#ifdef STRIP_EXTENSION
-	if (!found_template_hook) {
-		strbuf_addstr(&template_path, STRIP_EXTENSION);
-		found_template_hook = access(template_path.buf, X_OK) >= 0;
-	}
-#endif
-	if (!found_template_hook) {
-		strbuf_release(&template_path);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	ret = do_files_match(template_path.buf, path);
-
-	strbuf_release(&template_path);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 const char *find_hook(const char *name)
 {
 	static struct strbuf path = STRBUF_INIT;
@@ -64,14 +38,6 @@ const char *find_hook(const char *name)
 		}
 		return NULL;
 	}
-	if (!git_hooks_path && git_env_bool("GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE", 0) &&
-	    !identical_to_template_hook(name, path.buf))
-		die(_("active `%s` hook found during `git clone`:\n\t%s\n"
-		      "For security reasons, this is disallowed by default.\n"
-		      "If this is intentional and the hook should actually "
-		      "be run, please\nrun the command again with "
-		      "`GIT_CLONE_PROTECTION_ACTIVE=false`"),
-		    name, path.buf);
 	return path.buf;
 }