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| author | Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> | 2024-04-17 11:38:18 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de> | 2024-04-19 12:38:42 +0200 |
| commit | f5b2af06f55c0f21ae0199be5fe120f2cccd698b (patch) | |
| tree | 8a247278428ea30cef8baeb0d98e425f3fb51028 /setup.c | |
| parent | Merge branch 'jk/redact-h2h3-headers-fix' into maint-2.41 (diff) | |
| parent | Git 2.40.2 (diff) | |
| download | git-f5b2af06f55c0f21ae0199be5fe120f2cccd698b.tar.gz git-f5b2af06f55c0f21ae0199be5fe120f2cccd698b.zip | |
Sync with 2.40.2
* maint-2.40: (39 commits)
Git 2.40.2
Git 2.39.4
fsck: warn about symlink pointing inside a gitdir
core.hooksPath: add some protection while cloning
init.templateDir: consider this config setting protected
clone: prevent hooks from running during a clone
Add a helper function to compare file contents
init: refactor the template directory discovery into its own function
find_hook(): refactor the `STRIP_EXTENSION` logic
clone: when symbolic links collide with directories, keep the latter
entry: report more colliding paths
t5510: verify that D/F confusion cannot lead to an RCE
submodule: require the submodule path to contain directories only
clone_submodule: avoid using `access()` on directories
submodules: submodule paths must not contain symlinks
clone: prevent clashing git dirs when cloning submodule in parallel
t7423: add tests for symlinked submodule directories
has_dir_name(): do not get confused by characters < '/'
docs: document security issues around untrusted .git dirs
upload-pack: disable lazy-fetching by default
...
Diffstat (limited to 'setup.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | setup.c | 76 |
1 files changed, 76 insertions, 0 deletions
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "quote.h" #include "trace2.h" #include "wrapper.h" +#include "exec-cmd.h" static int inside_git_dir = -1; static int inside_work_tree = -1; @@ -1172,6 +1173,27 @@ static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *gitfile, return data.is_safe; } +void die_upon_dubious_ownership(const char *gitfile, const char *worktree, + const char *gitdir) +{ + struct strbuf report = STRBUF_INIT, quoted = STRBUF_INIT; + const char *path; + + if (ensure_valid_ownership(gitfile, worktree, gitdir, &report)) + return; + + strbuf_complete(&report, '\n'); + path = gitfile ? gitfile : gitdir; + sq_quote_buf_pretty("ed, path); + + die(_("detected dubious ownership in repository at '%s'\n" + "%s" + "To add an exception for this directory, call:\n" + "\n" + "\tgit config --global --add safe.directory %s"), + path, report.buf, quoted.buf); +} + static int allowed_bare_repo_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d) { enum allowed_bare_repo *allowed_bare_repo = d; @@ -1707,3 +1729,57 @@ int daemonize(void) return 0; #endif } + +#ifndef DEFAULT_GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR +#define DEFAULT_GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR "/usr/share/git-core/templates" +#endif + +struct template_dir_cb_data { + char *path; + int initialized; +}; + +static int template_dir_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d) +{ + struct template_dir_cb_data *data = d; + + if (strcmp(key, "init.templatedir")) + return 0; + + if (!value) { + data->path = NULL; + } else { + char *path = NULL; + + FREE_AND_NULL(data->path); + if (!git_config_pathname((const char **)&path, key, value)) + data->path = path ? path : xstrdup(value); + } + + return 0; +} + +const char *get_template_dir(const char *option_template) +{ + const char *template_dir = option_template; + + if (!template_dir) + template_dir = getenv(TEMPLATE_DIR_ENVIRONMENT); + if (!template_dir) { + static struct template_dir_cb_data data; + + if (!data.initialized) { + git_protected_config(template_dir_cb, &data); + data.initialized = 1; + } + template_dir = data.path; + } + if (!template_dir) { + static char *dir; + + if (!dir) + dir = system_path(DEFAULT_GIT_TEMPLATE_DIR); + template_dir = dir; + } + return template_dir; +} |
