Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR (net-6.15-rc3).

No conflicts. Adjacent changes:

tools/net/ynl/pyynl/ynl_gen_c.py
  4d07bbf2d456 ("tools: ynl-gen: don't declare loop iterator in place")
  7e8ba0c7de2b ("tools: ynl: don't use genlmsghdr in classic netlink")

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

24 files changed, 319 insertions, 161 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rqspinlock.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rqspinlock.h
index 5b80785324b6..9ea0a74e5892 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rqspinlock.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rqspinlock.h
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
 
 #endif
 
-#define res_smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c) smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c, 0, 1)
+#define res_smp_cond_load_acquire(v, c) smp_cond_load_acquire_timewait(v, c, 0, 1)
 
 #include <asm-generic/rqspinlock.h>
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index db8161ebb43c..99fb986fca6e 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -332,6 +332,10 @@ config HAVE_MARCH_Z16_FEATURES
 	def_bool n
 	select HAVE_MARCH_Z15_FEATURES
 
+config HAVE_MARCH_Z17_FEATURES
+	def_bool n
+	select HAVE_MARCH_Z16_FEATURES
+
 choice
 	prompt "Processor type"
 	default MARCH_Z196
@@ -397,6 +401,14 @@ config MARCH_Z16
 	  Select this to enable optimizations for IBM z16 (3931 and
 	  3932 series).
 
+config MARCH_Z17
+	bool "IBM z17"
+	select HAVE_MARCH_Z17_FEATURES
+	depends on $(cc-option,-march=z17)
+	help
+	  Select this to enable optimizations for IBM z17 (9175 and
+	  9176 series).
+
 endchoice
 
 config MARCH_Z10_TUNE
@@ -420,6 +432,9 @@ config MARCH_Z15_TUNE
 config MARCH_Z16_TUNE
 	def_bool TUNE_Z16 || MARCH_Z16 && TUNE_DEFAULT
 
+config MARCH_Z17_TUNE
+	def_bool TUNE_Z17 || MARCH_Z17 && TUNE_DEFAULT
+
 choice
 	prompt "Tune code generation"
 	default TUNE_DEFAULT
@@ -464,6 +479,10 @@ config TUNE_Z16
 	bool "IBM z16"
 	depends on $(cc-option,-mtune=z16)
 
+config TUNE_Z17
+	bool "IBM z17"
+	depends on $(cc-option,-mtune=z17)
+
 endchoice
 
 config 64BIT
diff --git a/arch/s390/Makefile b/arch/s390/Makefile
index b06dc53bfed5..7679bc16b692 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/Makefile
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z13)    := -march=z13
 mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z14)    := -march=z14
 mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z15)    := -march=z15
 mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z16)    := -march=z16
+mflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z17)    := -march=z17
 
 export CC_FLAGS_MARCH := $(mflags-y)
 
@@ -61,6 +62,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z13_TUNE)		+= -mtune=z13
 cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z14_TUNE)		+= -mtune=z14
 cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z15_TUNE)		+= -mtune=z15
 cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z16_TUNE)		+= -mtune=z16
+cflags-$(CONFIG_MARCH_Z17_TUNE)		+= -mtune=z17
 
 cflags-y += -Wa,-I$(srctree)/arch/$(ARCH)/include
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/march.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/march.h
index fd9eef3be44c..11a71bd14954 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/march.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/march.h
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@
 #define MARCH_HAS_Z16_FEATURES 1
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_MARCH_Z17_FEATURES
+#define MARCH_HAS_Z17_FEATURES 1
+#endif
+
 #endif /* __DECOMPRESSOR */
 
 #endif /* __ASM_S390_MARCH_H */
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c
index 33205dd410e4..e657fad7e376 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static void cpum_cf_make_setsize(enum cpumf_ctr_set ctrset)
 			ctrset_size = 48;
 		else if (cpumf_ctr_info.csvn >= 3 && cpumf_ctr_info.csvn <= 5)
 			ctrset_size = 128;
-		else if (cpumf_ctr_info.csvn == 6 || cpumf_ctr_info.csvn == 7)
+		else if (cpumf_ctr_info.csvn >= 6 && cpumf_ctr_info.csvn <= 8)
 			ctrset_size = 160;
 		break;
 	case CPUMF_CTR_SET_MT_DIAG:
@@ -858,18 +858,13 @@ static int cpumf_pmu_event_type(struct perf_event *event)
 static int cpumf_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 {
 	unsigned int type = event->attr.type;
-	int err;
+	int err = -ENOENT;
 
 	if (type == PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE || type == PERF_TYPE_RAW)
 		err = __hw_perf_event_init(event, type);
 	else if (event->pmu->type == type)
 		/* Registered as unknown PMU */
 		err = __hw_perf_event_init(event, cpumf_pmu_event_type(event));
-	else
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	if (unlikely(err) && event->destroy)
-		event->destroy(event);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -1819,8 +1814,6 @@ static int cfdiag_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	event->destroy = hw_perf_event_destroy;
 
 	err = cfdiag_event_init2(event);
-	if (unlikely(err))
-		event->destroy(event);
 out:
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf_events.c b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf_events.c
index e4a6bfc91080..690a293eb10d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf_events.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_cf_events.c
@@ -237,7 +237,6 @@ CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z14, TX_C_TABORT_NO_SPECIAL, 0x00f4);
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z14, TX_C_TABORT_SPECIAL, 0x00f5);
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z14, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_ONE_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c0);
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z14, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_TWO_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c1);
-
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z15, L1D_RO_EXCL_WRITES, 0x0080);
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z15, DTLB2_WRITES, 0x0081);
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z15, DTLB2_MISSES, 0x0082);
@@ -365,6 +364,83 @@ CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z16, NNPA_WAIT_LOCK, 0x010d);
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z16, NNPA_HOLD_LOCK, 0x010e);
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z16, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_ONE_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c0);
 CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z16, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_TWO_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c1);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, L1D_RO_EXCL_WRITES, 0x0080);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_WRITES, 0x0081);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_MISSES, 0x0082);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, CRSTE_1MB_WRITES, 0x0083);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_GPAGE_WRITES, 0x0084);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ITLB2_WRITES, 0x0086);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ITLB2_MISSES, 0x0087);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TLB2_PTE_WRITES, 0x0089);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TLB2_CRSTE_WRITES, 0x008a);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TLB2_ENGINES_BUSY, 0x008b);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TEND, 0x008c);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_NC_TEND, 0x008d);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, L1C_TLB2_MISSES, 0x008f);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ, 0x0091);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_IV, 0x0092);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_CHIP_HIT, 0x0093);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_DRAWER_HIT, 0x0094);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP, 0x0095);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_IV, 0x0096);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_CHIP_HIT, 0x0097);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_DRAWER_HIT, 0x0098);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_MODULE, 0x0099);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_DRAWER, 0x009a);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_OFF_DRAWER, 0x009b);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_MEMORY, 0x009c);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_MODULE_MEMORY, 0x009d);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_DRAWER_MEMORY, 0x009e);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DCW_OFF_DRAWER_MEMORY, 0x009f);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_IV, 0x00a0);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_CHIP_HIT, 0x00a1);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00a2);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_IV, 0x00a3);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_CHIP_HIT, 0x00a4);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00a5);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_IV, 0x00a6);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_CHIP_HIT, 0x00a7);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00a8);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ, 0x00a9);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_IV, 0x00aa);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_CHIP_HIT, 0x00ab);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00ac);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP, 0x00ad);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_IV, 0x00ae);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_CHIP_HIT, 0x00af);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_DRAWER_HIT, 0x00b0);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_MODULE, 0x00b1);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_DRAWER, 0x00b2);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, ICW_OFF_DRAWER, 0x00b3);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, CYCLES_SAMETHRD, 0x00ca);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, CYCLES_DIFFTHRD, 0x00cb);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, INST_SAMETHRD, 0x00cc);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, INST_DIFFTHRD, 0x00cd);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, WRONG_BRANCH_PREDICTION, 0x00ce);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, VX_BCD_EXECUTION_SLOTS, 0x00e1);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DECIMAL_INSTRUCTIONS, 0x00e2);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, LAST_HOST_TRANSLATIONS, 0x00e8);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_NC_TABORT, 0x00f4);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TABORT_NO_SPECIAL, 0x00f5);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TABORT_SPECIAL, 0x00f6);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DFLT_ACCESS, 0x00f8);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CYCLES, 0x00fd);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, SORTL, 0x0100);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CC, 0x0109);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CCFINISH, 0x010a);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INVOCATIONS, 0x010b);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_COMPLETIONS, 0x010c);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_WAIT_LOCK, 0x010d);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_HOLD_LOCK, 0x010e);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_ONCHIP, 0x0110);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_OFFCHIP, 0x0111);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_DIFF, 0x0112);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_4K_PREFETCH, 0x0114);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_COMPL_LOCK, 0x0115);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_RETRY_LOCK, 0x0116);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, NNPA_RETRY_LOCK_WITH_PLO, 0x0117);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_ONE_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c0);
+CPUMF_EVENT_ATTR(cf_z17, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_TWO_THR_ACTIVE, 0x01c1);
 
 static struct attribute *cpumcf_fvn1_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
 	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_fvn1, CPU_CYCLES),
@@ -414,7 +490,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpumcf_svn_12345_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
 	NULL,
 };
 
-static struct attribute *cpumcf_svn_67_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
+static struct attribute *cpumcf_svn_678_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
 	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_svn_12345, PRNG_FUNCTIONS),
 	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_svn_12345, PRNG_CYCLES),
 	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_svn_12345, PRNG_BLOCKED_FUNCTIONS),
@@ -779,6 +855,87 @@ static struct attribute *cpumcf_z16_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
 	NULL,
 };
 
+static struct attribute *cpumcf_z17_pmu_event_attr[] __initdata = {
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, L1D_RO_EXCL_WRITES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_WRITES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_MISSES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, CRSTE_1MB_WRITES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DTLB2_GPAGE_WRITES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ITLB2_WRITES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ITLB2_MISSES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TLB2_PTE_WRITES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TLB2_CRSTE_WRITES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TLB2_ENGINES_BUSY),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TEND),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_NC_TEND),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, L1C_TLB2_MISSES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_IV),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_CHIP_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_REQ_DRAWER_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_IV),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_CHIP_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_DRAWER_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_MODULE),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_DRAWER),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_OFF_DRAWER),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_CHIP_MEMORY),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_MODULE_MEMORY),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_ON_DRAWER_MEMORY),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DCW_OFF_DRAWER_MEMORY),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_IV),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_CHIP_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_MODULE_DRAWER_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_IV),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_CHIP_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_ON_DRAWER_DRAWER_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_IV),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_CHIP_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, IDCW_OFF_DRAWER_DRAWER_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_IV),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_CHIP_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_REQ_DRAWER_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_IV),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_CHIP_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_CHIP_DRAWER_HIT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_MODULE),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_ON_DRAWER),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, ICW_OFF_DRAWER),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, CYCLES_SAMETHRD),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, CYCLES_DIFFTHRD),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, INST_SAMETHRD),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, INST_DIFFTHRD),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, WRONG_BRANCH_PREDICTION),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, VX_BCD_EXECUTION_SLOTS),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DECIMAL_INSTRUCTIONS),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, LAST_HOST_TRANSLATIONS),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_NC_TABORT),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TABORT_NO_SPECIAL),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, TX_C_TABORT_SPECIAL),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DFLT_ACCESS),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CYCLES),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, SORTL),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CC),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, DFLT_CCFINISH),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INVOCATIONS),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_COMPLETIONS),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_WAIT_LOCK),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_HOLD_LOCK),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_ONCHIP),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_OFFCHIP),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_INST_DIFF),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_4K_PREFETCH),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_COMPL_LOCK),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_RETRY_LOCK),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, NNPA_RETRY_LOCK_WITH_PLO),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_ONE_THR_ACTIVE),
+	CPUMF_EVENT_PTR(cf_z17, MT_DIAG_CYCLES_TWO_THR_ACTIVE),
+	NULL,
+};
+
 /* END: CPUM_CF COUNTER DEFINITIONS ===================================== */
 
 static struct attribute_group cpumcf_pmu_events_group = {
@@ -859,7 +1016,7 @@ __init const struct attribute_group **cpumf_cf_event_group(void)
 	if (ci.csvn >= 1 && ci.csvn <= 5)
 		csvn = cpumcf_svn_12345_pmu_event_attr;
 	else if (ci.csvn >= 6)
-		csvn = cpumcf_svn_67_pmu_event_attr;
+		csvn = cpumcf_svn_678_pmu_event_attr;
 
 	/* Determine model-specific counter set(s) */
 	get_cpu_id(&cpu_id);
@@ -892,6 +1049,10 @@ __init const struct attribute_group **cpumf_cf_event_group(void)
 	case 0x3932:
 		model = cpumcf_z16_pmu_event_attr;
 		break;
+	case 0x9175:
+	case 0x9176:
+		model = cpumcf_z17_pmu_event_attr;
+		break;
 	default:
 		model = none;
 		break;
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
index 5f60248cb468..ad22799d8a7d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c
@@ -885,9 +885,6 @@ static int cpumsf_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 		event->attr.exclude_idle = 0;
 
 	err = __hw_perf_event_init(event);
-	if (unlikely(err))
-		if (event->destroy)
-			event->destroy(event);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/processor.c b/arch/s390/kernel/processor.c
index 54e281436a28..80b1f7a29f11 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/processor.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/processor.c
@@ -294,6 +294,10 @@ static int __init setup_elf_platform(void)
 	case 0x3932:
 		strcpy(elf_platform, "z16");
 		break;
+	case 0x9175:
+	case 0x9176:
+		strcpy(elf_platform, "z17");
+		break;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c b/arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c
index 855f818deb98..d5c68ade71ab 100644
--- a/arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c
+++ b/arch/s390/tools/gen_facilities.c
@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ static struct facility_def facility_defs[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_MARCH_Z15_FEATURES
 			61, /* miscellaneous-instruction-extension 3 */
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_MARCH_Z17_FEATURES
+			84, /* miscellaneous-instruction-extension 4 */
+#endif
 			-1 /* END */
 		}
 	},
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S
index d3caa31240ed..175958b02f2b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S
@@ -17,19 +17,20 @@
 
 .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax"
 
-SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb)
+/* Clobbers AX, CX, DX */
+SYM_FUNC_START(write_ibpb)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx
-	movl	$PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax
+	movl	_ASM_RIP(x86_pred_cmd), %eax
 	xorl	%edx, %edx
 	wrmsr
 
 	/* Make sure IBPB clears return stack preductions too. */
 	FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET
 	RET
-SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb)
+SYM_FUNC_END(write_ibpb)
 /* For KVM */
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(write_ibpb);
 
 .popsection
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 8a5cc8e70439..5c43f145454d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@
  * typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
  *
  * While retbleed_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
- * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
+ * write_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
  *
  * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@
 	VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 	CALL_UNTRAIN_RET
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 "",						\
-		      "call entry_ibpb", \ibpb_feature,			\
+		      "call write_ibpb", \ibpb_feature,			\
 		     __stringify(\call_depth_insns), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
 #endif
 .endm
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
 extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
 
 extern void entry_untrain_ret(void);
-extern void entry_ibpb(void);
+extern void write_ibpb(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 extern void clear_bhb_loop(void);
@@ -514,11 +514,11 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
 		: "memory");
 }
 
-extern u64 x86_pred_cmd;
-
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, x86_pred_cmd, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+	asm_inline volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "call write_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
+			    : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
+			    :: "rax", "rcx", "rdx", "memory");
 }
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
index 55a5e656e4b9..4f84d421d1cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
@@ -16,23 +16,23 @@
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLER__
 
 #define ASM_CLAC \
-	ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ANNOTATE_IGNORE_ALTERNATIVE), "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP
 
 #define ASM_STAC \
-	ALTERNATIVE __stringify(ANNOTATE_IGNORE_ALTERNATIVE), "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLER__ */
 
 static __always_inline void clac(void)
 {
 	/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
-	alternative(ANNOTATE_IGNORE_ALTERNATIVE "", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
+	alternative("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
 }
 
 static __always_inline void stac(void)
 {
 	/* Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative() */
-	alternative(ANNOTATE_IGNORE_ALTERNATIVE "", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
+	alternative("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
 }
 
 static __always_inline unsigned long smap_save(void)
@@ -59,9 +59,9 @@ static __always_inline void smap_restore(unsigned long flags)
 
 /* These macros can be used in asm() statements */
 #define ASM_CLAC \
-	ALTERNATIVE(ANNOTATE_IGNORE_ALTERNATIVE "", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP)
+	ALTERNATIVE("", "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP)
 #define ASM_STAC \
-	ALTERNATIVE(ANNOTATE_IGNORE_ALTERNATIVE "", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP)
+	ALTERNATIVE("", "stac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP)
 
 #define ASM_CLAC_UNSAFE \
 	ALTERNATIVE("", ANNOTATE_IGNORE_ALTERNATIVE "clac", X86_FEATURE_SMAP)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
index dae6a73be40e..9fa321a95eb3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #include <linux/serial_core.h>
 #include <linux/pgtable.h>
 
+#include <xen/xen.h>
+
 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
 #include <asm/irqdomain.h>
 #include <asm/pci_x86.h>
@@ -1729,6 +1731,15 @@ int __init acpi_mps_check(void)
 {
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && !defined(CONFIG_X86_MPPARSE)
 /* mptable code is not built-in*/
+
+	/*
+	 * Xen disables ACPI in PV DomU guests but it still emulates APIC and
+	 * supports SMP. Returning early here ensures that APIC is not disabled
+	 * unnecessarily and the guest is not limited to a single vCPU.
+	 */
+	if (xen_pv_domain() && !xen_initial_domain())
+		return 0;
+
 	if (acpi_disabled || acpi_noirq) {
 		pr_warn("MPS support code is not built-in, using acpi=off or acpi=noirq or pci=noacpi may have problem\n");
 		return 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 79569f72b8ee..a839ff506f45 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -805,6 +805,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 static const struct x86_cpu_id erratum_1386_microcode[] = {
 	X86_MATCH_VFM_STEPS(VFM_MAKE(X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x17, 0x01), 0x2, 0x2, 0x0800126e),
 	X86_MATCH_VFM_STEPS(VFM_MAKE(X86_VENDOR_AMD, 0x17, 0x31), 0x0, 0x0, 0x08301052),
+	{}
 };
 
 static void fix_erratum_1386(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 4386aa6c69e1..362602b705cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 
 u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
 
 static u64 __ro_after_init x86_arch_cap_msr;
 
@@ -1142,7 +1141,7 @@ do_cmd_auto:
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
 
 		/*
-		 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+		 * There is no need for RSB filling: write_ibpb() ensures
 		 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
 		 * regardless of IBPB implementation.
 		 */
@@ -1592,51 +1591,54 @@ static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
 	rrsba_disabled = true;
 }
 
-static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
 {
 	/*
-	 * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
-	 * after VM exit:
+	 * WARNING! There are many subtleties to consider when changing *any*
+	 * code related to RSB-related mitigations.  Before doing so, carefully
+	 * read the following document, and update if necessary:
 	 *
-	 * 1) RSB underflow
+	 *   Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/rsb.rst
 	 *
-	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+	 * In an overly simplified nutshell:
 	 *
-	 * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
-	 * the RSB.
+	 *   - User->user RSB attacks are conditionally mitigated during
+	 *     context switches by cond_mitigation -> write_ibpb().
 	 *
-	 * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
-	 * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
-	 * because of #2.  Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
-	 * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
+	 *   - User->kernel and guest->host attacks are mitigated by eIBRS or
+	 *     RSB filling.
 	 *
-	 * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB
-	 * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required,
-	 * just a single call needs to retire before a RET is executed.
+	 *     Though, depending on config, note that other alternative
+	 *     mitigations may end up getting used instead, e.g., IBPB on
+	 *     entry/vmexit, call depth tracking, or return thunks.
 	 */
+
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
-		return;
+		break;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 		}
-		return;
+		break;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB: Filling RSB on context switch and VMEXIT\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
-		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
-		return;
-	}
+		break;
 
-	pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");
-	dump_stack();
+	default:
+		pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation\n");
+		dump_stack();
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1830,48 +1832,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
-	/*
-	 * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a
-	 * context switch.  In general there are two types of RSB attacks
-	 * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced.
-	 *
-	 * 1) RSB underflow
-	 *
-	 *    Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB".  When the RSB is empty,
-	 *    speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor,
-	 *    which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry.
-	 *
-	 *    AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB,
-	 *    regardless of the state of the RSB.
-	 *
-	 *    When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack
-	 *    scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation
-	 *    properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to
-	 *    protect against this type of attack.
-	 *
-	 *    The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling.
-	 *
-	 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
-	 *
-	 *    If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev',
-	 *    'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB
-	 *    entry.
-	 *
-	 *    The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and
-	 *    eIBRS.
-	 *
-	 *    The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires
-	 *    RSB clearing.
-	 *
-	 * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context
-	 * switches.
-	 *
-	 * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD?
-	 */
-	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
-	pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
-
-	spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
+	spectre_v2_select_rsb_mitigation(mode);
 
 	/*
 	 * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware.  IBRS
@@ -2676,7 +2637,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
 				setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
 
 				/*
-				 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+				 * There is no need for RSB filling: write_ibpb() ensures
 				 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
 				 * regardless of IBPB implementation.
 				 */
@@ -2701,7 +2662,7 @@ ibpb_on_vmexit:
 				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
 
 				/*
-				 * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures
+				 * There is no need for RSB filling: write_ibpb() ensures
 				 * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated,
 				 * regardless of IBPB implementation.
 				 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 93ec829015f1..cc4a54145c83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -3553,6 +3553,22 @@ static void mkdir_rdt_prepare_rmid_free(struct rdtgroup *rgrp)
 		free_rmid(rgrp->closid, rgrp->mon.rmid);
 }
 
+/*
+ * We allow creating mon groups only with in a directory called "mon_groups"
+ * which is present in every ctrl_mon group. Check if this is a valid
+ * "mon_groups" directory.
+ *
+ * 1. The directory should be named "mon_groups".
+ * 2. The mon group itself should "not" be named "mon_groups".
+ *   This makes sure "mon_groups" directory always has a ctrl_mon group
+ *   as parent.
+ */
+static bool is_mon_groups(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name)
+{
+	return (!strcmp(rdt_kn_name(kn), "mon_groups") &&
+		strcmp(name, "mon_groups"));
+}
+
 static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
 			     const char *name, umode_t mode,
 			     enum rdt_group_type rtype, struct rdtgroup **r)
@@ -3568,6 +3584,15 @@ static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Check that the parent directory for a monitor group is a "mon_groups"
+	 * directory.
+	 */
+	if (rtype == RDTMON_GROUP && !is_mon_groups(parent_kn, name)) {
+		ret = -EPERM;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
 	if (rtype == RDTMON_GROUP &&
 	    (prdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP ||
 	     prdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED)) {
@@ -3751,22 +3776,6 @@ out_unlock:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-/*
- * We allow creating mon groups only with in a directory called "mon_groups"
- * which is present in every ctrl_mon group. Check if this is a valid
- * "mon_groups" directory.
- *
- * 1. The directory should be named "mon_groups".
- * 2. The mon group itself should "not" be named "mon_groups".
- *   This makes sure "mon_groups" directory always has a ctrl_mon group
- *   as parent.
- */
-static bool is_mon_groups(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name)
-{
-	return (!strcmp(rdt_kn_name(kn), "mon_groups") &&
-		strcmp(name, "mon_groups"));
-}
-
 static int rdtgroup_mkdir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, const char *name,
 			  umode_t mode)
 {
@@ -3782,11 +3791,8 @@ static int rdtgroup_mkdir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, const char *name,
 	if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable() && parent_kn == rdtgroup_default.kn)
 		return rdtgroup_mkdir_ctrl_mon(parent_kn, name, mode);
 
-	/*
-	 * If RDT monitoring is supported and the parent directory is a valid
-	 * "mon_groups" directory, add a monitoring subdirectory.
-	 */
-	if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable() && is_mon_groups(parent_kn, name))
+	/* Else, attempt to add a monitoring subdirectory. */
+	if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
 		return rdtgroup_mkdir_mon(parent_kn, name, mode);
 
 	return -EPERM;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
index 57120f0749cc..9d8dd8deb2a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/e820.c
@@ -753,22 +753,21 @@ void __init e820__memory_setup_extended(u64 phys_addr, u32 data_len)
 void __init e820__register_nosave_regions(unsigned long limit_pfn)
 {
 	int i;
-	unsigned long pfn = 0;
+	u64 last_addr = 0;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < e820_table->nr_entries; i++) {
 		struct e820_entry *entry = &e820_table->entries[i];
 
-		if (pfn < PFN_UP(entry->addr))
-			register_nosave_region(pfn, PFN_UP(entry->addr));
-
-		pfn = PFN_DOWN(entry->addr + entry->size);
-
 		if (entry->type != E820_TYPE_RAM)
-			register_nosave_region(PFN_UP(entry->addr), pfn);
+			continue;
 
-		if (pfn >= limit_pfn)
-			break;
+		if (last_addr < entry->addr)
+			register_nosave_region(PFN_DOWN(last_addr), PFN_UP(entry->addr));
+
+		last_addr = entry->addr + entry->size;
 	}
+
+	register_nosave_region(PFN_DOWN(last_addr), limit_pfn);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/early_printk.c b/arch/x86/kernel/early_printk.c
index 611f27e3890c..3aad78bfcb26 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/early_printk.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/early_printk.c
@@ -389,10 +389,10 @@ static int __init setup_early_printk(char *buf)
 	keep = (strstr(buf, "keep") != NULL);
 
 	while (*buf != '\0') {
-		if (!strncmp(buf, "mmio", 4)) {
-			early_mmio_serial_init(buf + 4);
+		if (!strncmp(buf, "mmio32", 6)) {
+			buf += 6;
+			early_mmio_serial_init(buf);
 			early_console_register(&early_serial_console, keep);
-			buf += 4;
 		}
 		if (!strncmp(buf, "serial", 6)) {
 			buf += 6;
@@ -407,9 +407,9 @@ static int __init setup_early_printk(char *buf)
 		}
 #ifdef CONFIG_PCI
 		if (!strncmp(buf, "pciserial", 9)) {
-			early_pci_serial_init(buf + 9);
+			buf += 9; /* Keep from match the above "pciserial" */
+			early_pci_serial_init(buf);
 			early_console_register(&early_serial_console, keep);
-			buf += 9; /* Keep from match the above "serial" */
 		}
 #endif
 		if (!strncmp(buf, "vga", 3) &&
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index e459d97ef397..eb83348f9305 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -667,9 +667,9 @@ static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next)
 	prev_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec);
 
 	/*
-	 * Avoid user/user BTB poisoning by flushing the branch predictor
-	 * when switching between processes. This stops one process from
-	 * doing Spectre-v2 attacks on another.
+	 * Avoid user->user BTB/RSB poisoning by flushing them when switching
+	 * between processes. This stops one process from doing Spectre-v2
+	 * attacks on another.
 	 *
 	 * Both, the conditional and the always IBPB mode use the mm
 	 * pointer to avoid the IBPB when switching between tasks of the
diff --git a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S
index 8c534c36adfa..66f066b8feda 100644
--- a/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/power/hibernate_asm_64.S
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 	 /* code below belongs to the image kernel */
 	.align PAGE_SIZE
 SYM_FUNC_START(restore_registers)
-	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+	ENDBR
 	/* go back to the original page tables */
 	movq    %r9, %cr3
 
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(restore_image)
 
 	/* code below has been relocated to a safe page */
 SYM_FUNC_START(core_restore_code)
-	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+	ENDBR
 	/* switch to temporary page tables */
 	movq	%rax, %cr3
 	/* flush TLB */
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/multicalls.c b/arch/x86/xen/multicalls.c
index 10c660fae8b3..7237d56a9d3f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/multicalls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/multicalls.c
@@ -54,14 +54,20 @@ struct mc_debug_data {
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mc_buffer, mc_buffer);
 static struct mc_debug_data mc_debug_data_early __initdata;
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mc_debug_data *, mc_debug_data) =
-	&mc_debug_data_early;
 static struct mc_debug_data __percpu *mc_debug_data_ptr;
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, xen_mc_irq_flags);
 
 static struct static_key mc_debug __ro_after_init;
 static bool mc_debug_enabled __initdata;
 
+static struct mc_debug_data * __ref get_mc_debug(void)
+{
+	if (!mc_debug_data_ptr)
+		return &mc_debug_data_early;
+
+	return this_cpu_ptr(mc_debug_data_ptr);
+}
+
 static int __init xen_parse_mc_debug(char *arg)
 {
 	mc_debug_enabled = true;
@@ -71,20 +77,16 @@ static int __init xen_parse_mc_debug(char *arg)
 }
 early_param("xen_mc_debug", xen_parse_mc_debug);
 
-void mc_percpu_init(unsigned int cpu)
-{
-	per_cpu(mc_debug_data, cpu) = per_cpu_ptr(mc_debug_data_ptr, cpu);
-}
-
 static int __init mc_debug_enable(void)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
+	struct mc_debug_data __percpu *mcdb;
 
 	if (!mc_debug_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	mc_debug_data_ptr = alloc_percpu(struct mc_debug_data);
-	if (!mc_debug_data_ptr) {
+	mcdb = alloc_percpu(struct mc_debug_data);
+	if (!mcdb) {
 		pr_err("xen_mc_debug inactive\n");
 		static_key_slow_dec(&mc_debug);
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -93,7 +95,7 @@ static int __init mc_debug_enable(void)
 	/* Be careful when switching to percpu debug data. */
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 	xen_mc_flush();
-	mc_percpu_init(0);
+	mc_debug_data_ptr = mcdb;
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 
 	pr_info("xen_mc_debug active\n");
@@ -155,7 +157,7 @@ void xen_mc_flush(void)
 	trace_xen_mc_flush(b->mcidx, b->argidx, b->cbidx);
 
 	if (static_key_false(&mc_debug)) {
-		mcdb = __this_cpu_read(mc_debug_data);
+		mcdb = get_mc_debug();
 		memcpy(mcdb->entries, b->entries,
 		       b->mcidx * sizeof(struct multicall_entry));
 	}
@@ -235,7 +237,7 @@ struct multicall_space __xen_mc_entry(size_t args)
 
 	ret.mc = &b->entries[b->mcidx];
 	if (static_key_false(&mc_debug)) {
-		struct mc_debug_data *mcdb = __this_cpu_read(mc_debug_data);
+		struct mc_debug_data *mcdb = get_mc_debug();
 
 		mcdb->caller[b->mcidx] = __builtin_return_address(0);
 		mcdb->argsz[b->mcidx] = args;
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
index 688ff59318ae..9bb8ff8bff30 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/smp_pv.c
@@ -305,7 +305,6 @@ static int xen_pv_kick_ap(unsigned int cpu, struct task_struct *idle)
 		return rc;
 
 	xen_pmu_init(cpu);
-	mc_percpu_init(cpu);
 
 	/*
 	 * Why is this a BUG? If the hypercall fails then everything can be
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
index 109af12f7647..461bb1526502 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -226,9 +226,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(xen_early_idt_handler_array)
 	push %rax
 	mov  $__HYPERVISOR_iret, %eax
 	syscall		/* Do the IRET. */
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
-	int3
-#endif
+	ud2		/* The SYSCALL should never return. */
 .endm
 
 SYM_CODE_START(xen_iret)
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
index 63c13a2ccf55..25e318ef27d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-ops.h
@@ -261,9 +261,6 @@ void xen_mc_callback(void (*fn)(void *), void *data);
  */
 struct multicall_space xen_mc_extend_args(unsigned long op, size_t arg_size);
 
-/* Do percpu data initialization for multicalls. */
-void mc_percpu_init(unsigned int cpu);
-
 extern bool is_xen_pmu;
 
 irqreturn_t xen_pmu_irq_handler(int irq, void *dev_id);