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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-08-04 08:17:28 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2025-08-04 08:17:28 -0700
commit8b45c6c90af6702b2ad716e148b8bcd5231a8070 (patch)
treed79ffe6e9a3e1baf1d82cdf79b339b2abe7e1d61 /security/apparmor/capability.c
parentMerge tag 'rtc-6.17' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/abellon... (diff)
parentapparmor: fix: oops when trying to free null ruleset (diff)
downloadlinux-8b45c6c90af6702b2ad716e148b8bcd5231a8070.tar.gz
linux-8b45c6c90af6702b2ad716e148b8bcd5231a8070.zip
Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2025-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen: "This has one major feature, it pulls in a cleaned up version of af_unix mediation that Ubuntu has been carrying for years. It is placed behind a new abi to ensure that it does cause policy regressions. With pulling in the af_unix mediation there have been cleanups and some refactoring of network socket mediation. This accounts for the majority of the changes in the diff. In addition there are a few improvements providing minor code optimizations. several code cleanups, and bug fixes. Features: - improve debug printing - carry mediation check on label (optimization) - improve ability for compiler to optimize __begin_current_label_crit_section - transition for a linked list of rulesets to a vector of rulesets - don't hardcode profile signal, allow it to be set by policy - ability to mediate caps via the state machine instead of lut - Add Ubuntu af_unix mediation, put it behind new v9 abi Cleanups: - fix typos and spelling errors - cleanup kernel doc and code inconsistencies - remove redundant checks/code - remove unused variables - Use str_yes_no() helper function - mark tables static where appropriate - make all generated string array headers const char *const - refactor to doc semantics of file_perm checks - replace macro calls to network/socket fns with explicit calls - refactor/cleanup socket mediation code preparing for finer grained mediation of different network families - several updates to kernel doc comments Bug fixes: - fix incorrect profile->signal range check - idmap mount fixes - policy unpack unaligned access fixes - kfree_sensitive() where appropriate - fix oops when freeing policy - fix conflicting attachment resolution - fix exec table look-ups when stacking isn't first - fix exec auditing - mitigate userspace generating overly large xtables" * tag 'apparmor-pr-2025-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (60 commits) apparmor: fix: oops when trying to free null ruleset apparmor: fix Regression on linux-next (next-20250721) apparmor: fix test error: WARNING in apparmor_unix_stream_connect apparmor: Remove the unused variable rules apparmor: fix: accept2 being specifie even when permission table is presnt apparmor: transition from a list of rules to a vector of rules apparmor: fix documentation mismatches in val_mask_to_str and socket functions apparmor: remove redundant perms.allow MAY_EXEC bitflag set apparmor: fix kernel doc warnings for kernel test robot apparmor: Fix unaligned memory accesses in KUnit test apparmor: Fix 8-byte alignment for initial dfa blob streams apparmor: shift uid when mediating af_unix in userns apparmor: shift ouid when mediating hard links in userns apparmor: make sure unix socket labeling is correctly updated. apparmor: fix regression in fs based unix sockets when using old abi apparmor: fix AA_DEBUG_LABEL() apparmor: fix af_unix auditing to include all address information apparmor: Remove use of the double lock apparmor: update kernel doc comments for xxx_label_crit_section apparmor: make __begin_current_label_crit_section() indicate whether put is needed ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/capability.c61
1 files changed, 57 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/capability.c b/security/apparmor/capability.c
index 7ca489ee1054..b9ea6bc45c1a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/capability.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/capability.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_caps[] = {
AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_CAPS_MASK),
+ AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("extended", 1),
{ }
};
@@ -68,8 +69,7 @@ static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile
{
const u64 AUDIT_CACHE_TIMEOUT_NS = 1000*1000*1000; /* 1 second */
- struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
- typeof(*rules), list);
+ struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
struct audit_cache *ent;
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
@@ -121,10 +121,32 @@ static int audit_caps(struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, struct aa_profile *profile
static int profile_capable(struct aa_profile *profile, int cap,
unsigned int opts, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
{
- struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
- typeof(*rules), list);
+ struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+ aa_state_t state;
int error;
+ state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, ad->class);
+ if (state) {
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ u32 request;
+
+ /* caps broken into 256 x 32 bit permission chunks */
+ state = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, cap >> 5);
+ request = 1 << (cap & 0x1f);
+ perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+
+ if (opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) {
+ if (perms.complain & request)
+ ad->info = "optional: no audit";
+ else
+ ad = NULL;
+ }
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+ audit_cb);
+ }
+
+ /* fallback to old caps mediation that doesn't support conditionals */
if (cap_raised(rules->caps.allow, cap) &&
!cap_raised(rules->caps.denied, cap))
error = 0;
@@ -168,3 +190,34 @@ int aa_capable(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
return error;
}
+
+kernel_cap_t aa_profile_capget(struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+ aa_state_t state;
+
+ state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_CAP);
+ if (state) {
+ kernel_cap_t caps = CAP_EMPTY_SET;
+ int i;
+
+ /* caps broken into up to 256, 32 bit permission chunks */
+ for (i = 0; i < (CAP_LAST_CAP >> 5); i++) {
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+ aa_state_t tmp;
+
+ tmp = aa_dfa_next(rules->policy->dfa, state, i);
+ perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, tmp);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.allow)) << (i * 5);
+ caps.val |= ((u64)(perms.complain)) << (i * 5);
+ }
+ return caps;
+ }
+
+ /* fallback to old caps */
+ if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
+ return CAP_FULL_SET;
+
+ return rules->caps.allow;
+}