Merge tag 'apparmor-pr-2025-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor

Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
 "This has one major feature, it pulls in a cleaned up version of
  af_unix mediation that Ubuntu has been carrying for years. It is
  placed behind a new abi to ensure that it does cause policy
  regressions. With pulling in the af_unix mediation there have been
  cleanups and some refactoring of network socket mediation. This
  accounts for the majority of the changes in the diff.

  In addition there are a few improvements providing minor code
  optimizations. several code cleanups, and bug fixes.

  Features:
   - improve debug printing
   - carry mediation check on label (optimization)
   - improve ability for compiler to optimize
     __begin_current_label_crit_section
   - transition for a linked list of rulesets to a vector of rulesets
   - don't hardcode profile signal, allow it to be set by policy
   - ability to mediate caps via the state machine instead of lut
   - Add Ubuntu af_unix mediation, put it behind new v9 abi

  Cleanups:
   - fix typos and spelling errors
   - cleanup kernel doc and code inconsistencies
   - remove redundant checks/code
   - remove unused variables
   - Use str_yes_no() helper function
   - mark tables static where appropriate
   - make all generated string array headers const char *const
   - refactor to doc semantics of file_perm checks
   - replace macro calls to network/socket fns with explicit calls
   - refactor/cleanup socket mediation code preparing for finer grained
     mediation of different network families
   - several updates to kernel doc comments

  Bug fixes:
   - fix incorrect profile->signal range check
   - idmap mount fixes
   - policy unpack unaligned access fixes
   - kfree_sensitive() where appropriate
   - fix oops when freeing policy
   - fix conflicting attachment resolution
   - fix exec table look-ups when stacking isn't first
   - fix exec auditing
   - mitigate userspace generating overly large xtables"

* tag 'apparmor-pr-2025-08-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (60 commits)
  apparmor: fix: oops when trying to free null ruleset
  apparmor: fix Regression on linux-next (next-20250721)
  apparmor: fix test error: WARNING in apparmor_unix_stream_connect
  apparmor: Remove the unused variable rules
  apparmor: fix: accept2 being specifie even when permission table is presnt
  apparmor: transition from a list of rules to a vector of rules
  apparmor: fix documentation mismatches in val_mask_to_str and socket functions
  apparmor: remove redundant perms.allow MAY_EXEC bitflag set
  apparmor: fix kernel doc warnings for kernel test robot
  apparmor: Fix unaligned memory accesses in KUnit test
  apparmor: Fix 8-byte alignment for initial dfa blob streams
  apparmor: shift uid when mediating af_unix in userns
  apparmor: shift ouid when mediating hard links in userns
  apparmor: make sure unix socket labeling is correctly updated.
  apparmor: fix regression in fs based unix sockets when using old abi
  apparmor: fix AA_DEBUG_LABEL()
  apparmor: fix af_unix auditing to include all address information
  apparmor: Remove use of the double lock
  apparmor: update kernel doc comments for xxx_label_crit_section
  apparmor: make __begin_current_label_crit_section() indicate whether put is needed
  ...

1 files changed, 163 insertions, 26 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
index 77413a519117..45cf25605c34 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/net.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
  */
 
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/audit.h"
 #include "include/cred.h"
@@ -24,6 +25,12 @@ struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
 	{ }
 };
 
+struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_networkv9[] = {
+	AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",	AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
+	AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("af_unix",	1),
+	{ }
+};
+
 static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
 	"unknown",
 	"send",
@@ -66,6 +73,42 @@ static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
 	"unknown",
 };
 
+static void audit_unix_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			    struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+	int len = unix_addr_len(addrlen);
+
+	if (!addr || len <= 0) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=none", str);
+	} else if (addr->sun_path[0]) {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", str);
+		audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, addr->sun_path);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " %s=\"@", str);
+		if (audit_string_contains_control(&addr->sun_path[1], len - 1))
+			audit_log_n_hex(ab, &addr->sun_path[1], len - 1);
+		else
+			audit_log_format(ab, "%.*s", len - 1,
+					 &addr->sun_path[1]);
+		audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+	}
+}
+
+static void audit_unix_sk_addr(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *str,
+			       const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	const struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+
+	if (u && u->addr) {
+		int addrlen;
+		struct sockaddr_un *addr = aa_sunaddr(u, &addrlen);
+
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, addr, addrlen);
+	} else {
+		audit_unix_addr(ab, str, NULL, 0);
+
+	}
+}
 
 /* audit callback for net specific fields */
 void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
@@ -73,12 +116,12 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 	struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
 	struct apparmor_audit_data *ad = aad(sa);
 
-	if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
+	if (address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family])
 		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
-				 address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
+				 address_family_names[ad->common.u.net->family]);
 	else
 		audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
-				 sa->u.net->family);
+				 ad->common.u.net->family);
 	if (sock_type_names[ad->net.type])
 		audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
 				 sock_type_names[ad->net.type]);
@@ -98,6 +141,19 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 					   net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
 		}
 	}
+	if (ad->common.u.net->family == PF_UNIX) {
+		if (ad->net.addr || !ad->common.u.net->sk)
+			audit_unix_addr(ab, "addr",
+					unix_addr(ad->net.addr),
+					ad->net.addrlen);
+		else
+			audit_unix_sk_addr(ab, "addr", ad->common.u.net->sk);
+		if (ad->request & NET_PEER_MASK) {
+			audit_unix_addr(ab, "peer_addr",
+					unix_addr(ad->net.peer.addr),
+					ad->net.peer.addrlen);
+		}
+	}
 	if (ad->peer) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
 		aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(ad->subj_label), ad->peer,
@@ -105,45 +161,123 @@ void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
 	}
 }
 
+/* standard permission lookup pattern - supports early bailout */
+int aa_do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_policydb *policy,
+		aa_state_t state, u32 request,
+		struct aa_perms *p, struct apparmor_audit_data *ad)
+{
+	struct aa_perms perms;
+
+	AA_BUG(!profile);
+	AA_BUG(!policy);
+
+
+	if (state || !p)
+		p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	perms = *p;
+	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad,
+			      audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+/* only continue match if
+ *   insufficient current perms at current state
+ *   indicates there are more perms in later state
+ * Returns: perms struct if early match
+ */
+static struct aa_perms *early_match(struct aa_policydb *policy,
+				    aa_state_t state, u32 request)
+{
+	struct aa_perms *p;
+
+	p = aa_lookup_perms(policy, state);
+	if (((p->allow & request) != request) && (p->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH))
+		return NULL;
+	return p;
+}
+
+static aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_be16(struct aa_dfa *dfa, aa_state_t state,
+					  u16 data)
+{
+	__be16 buffer = cpu_to_be16(data);
+
+	return aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, state, (char *) &buffer, 2);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_match_to_prot - match the af, type, protocol triplet
+ * @policy: policy being matched
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @request: permissions being requested, ignored if @p == NULL
+ * @af: socket address family
+ * @type: socket type
+ * @protocol: socket protocol
+ * @p: output - pointer to permission associated with match
+ * @info: output - pointer to string describing failure
+ *
+ * RETURNS: state match stopped in.
+ *
+ * If @(p) is assigned a value the returned state will be the
+ * corresponding state. Will not set @p on failure or if match completes
+ * only if an early match occurs
+ */
+aa_state_t aa_match_to_prot(struct aa_policydb *policy, aa_state_t state,
+			    u32 request, u16 af, int type, int protocol,
+			    struct aa_perms **p, const char **info)
+{
+	state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)af);
+	if (!state) {
+		*info = "failed af match";
+		return state;
+	}
+	state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)type);
+	if (state) {
+		if (p)
+			*p = early_match(policy, state, request);
+		if (!p || !*p) {
+			state = aa_dfa_match_be16(policy->dfa, state, (u16)protocol);
+			if (!state)
+				*info = "failed protocol match";
+		}
+	} else {
+		*info = "failed type match";
+	}
+
+	return state;
+}
+
 /* Generic af perm */
 int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
 		       struct apparmor_audit_data *ad, u32 request, u16 family,
-		       int type)
+		       int type, int protocol)
 {
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
-	struct aa_perms perms = { };
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
+	struct aa_perms *p = NULL;
 	aa_state_t state;
-	__be16 buffer[2];
 
 	AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
 	AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
+	AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
 
 	if (profile_unconfined(profile))
 		return 0;
-	state = RULE_MEDIATES(rules, AA_CLASS_NET);
+	state = RULE_MEDIATES_NET(rules);
 	if (!state)
 		return 0;
-
-	buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
-	buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
-	state = aa_dfa_match_len(rules->policy->dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
-				 4);
-	perms = *aa_lookup_perms(rules->policy, state);
-	aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
-
-	return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, ad, audit_net_cb);
+	state = aa_match_to_prot(rules->policy, state, request, family, type,
+				 protocol, &p, &ad->info);
+	return aa_do_perms(profile, rules->policy, state, request, p, ad);
 }
 
 int aa_af_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
 	       const char *op, u32 request, u16 family, int type, int protocol)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(ad, op, subj_cred, NULL, family, type, protocol);
 
 	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
 			aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &ad, request, family,
-					   type));
+					   type, protocol));
 }
 
 static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
@@ -157,9 +291,9 @@ static int aa_label_sk_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 	AA_BUG(!sk);
 
-	if (ctx->label != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
+	if (rcu_access_pointer(ctx->label) != kernel_t && !unconfined(label)) {
 		struct aa_profile *profile;
-		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
+		DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, subj_cred, sk);
 
 		ad.subj_cred = subj_cred;
 		error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
@@ -187,12 +321,16 @@ int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
 
 
 int aa_sock_file_perm(const struct cred *subj_cred, struct aa_label *label,
-		      const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+		      const char *op, u32 request, struct file *file)
 {
+	struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
+
 	AA_BUG(!label);
 	AA_BUG(!sock);
 	AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
 
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+		return aa_unix_file_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, file);
 	return aa_label_sk_perm(subj_cred, label, op, request, sock->sk);
 }
 
@@ -223,8 +361,7 @@ static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
 {
 	int i, ret;
 	struct aa_perms perms = { };
-	struct aa_ruleset *rules = list_first_entry(&profile->rules,
-						    typeof(*rules), list);
+	struct aa_ruleset *rules = profile->label.rules[0];
 
 	if (rules->secmark_count == 0)
 		return 0;
@@ -257,7 +394,7 @@ int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
 			   u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
-	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, sk);
+	DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(ad, op, NULL, sk);
 
 	return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
 				    aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,