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| author | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2025-08-27 04:37:40 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> | 2025-08-27 04:41:35 -0400 |
| commit | a6ad54137af92535cfe32e19e5f3bc1bb7dbd383 (patch) | |
| tree | 0a5b8e5566f45aa5d7fc68f7acd5178b09c44546 /tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/prog_array_init.c | |
| parent | Merge tag 'kvm-x86-fixes-6.17-rc7' of https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux into HEAD (diff) | |
| parent | KVM: selftests: Add guest_memfd testcase to fault-in on !mmap()'d memory (diff) | |
| download | linux-a6ad54137af92535cfe32e19e5f3bc1bb7dbd383.tar.gz linux-a6ad54137af92535cfe32e19e5f3bc1bb7dbd383.zip | |
Merge branch 'guest-memfd-mmap' into HEAD
Add support for host userspace mapping of guest_memfd-backed memory for VM
types that do NOT use support KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE (which isn't
precisely the same thing as CoCo VMs, since x86's SEV-MEM and SEV-ES have
no way to detect private vs. shared).
mmap() support paves the way for several evolving KVM use cases:
* Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests entirely backed by
guest_memfd [1]. This provides a unified memory management model for
both confidential and non-confidential guests, simplifying VMM design.
* Enhanced Security via direct map removal: When combined with Patrick's
series for direct map removal [2], this provides additional hardening
against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by eliminating the
need for host kernel direct maps of guest memory.
* Lays the groundwork for *restricted* mmap() support for guest_memfd-backed
memory on CoCo platforms [3] that permit in-place sharing of guest memory
with the host.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/prog_array_init.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions